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39 
CONSCIENCE, COERCION AND THE 
CONSTITUTION:  SOME THOUGHTS 
 
DWIGHT G. DUNCAN
* 
 
It is by the goodness of God that in our country we 
have those three unspeakably precious things: 
freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, and the 
prudence never to practice either of them. 1   
           —Mark Twain 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
 
 
 
 he ability of people to object to, and thus disregard, legal 
requirements for reasons of conscience has always been a 
matter of controversy.  Recent examples include the question 
of whether pharmacists who object to the “morning after pill” 
can be forced to dispense it against their conscientiously held 
beliefs, or whether a private adoption agency can be forced to 
serve homosexual couples contrary to its principles.  
Sometimes the objection is religiously motivated, and, 
increasingly in our secularized world, it is not.   
Historically, the question of conscientious objection was 
associated with the military draft and coerced military 
service.  More recently, it has extended to abortion and 
medical decisions generally, such as the ability of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses to refuse blood transfusions, or Christian Scientists 
to forego medical attention entirely and substitute spiritual 
treatments instead, or pro-lifers to refuse to participate in 
assisted suicide in places like Oregon, where it is legal.  The 
question of conscientious objection has arisen in connection 
with sex education in the public schools, and with whether 
people with moral objections to homosexual practice can be 
                                                 
* Professor, Southern New England School of Law.   
1 Mark Twain, Following the Equator and Anti-imperialist Essays 
195 (Oxford University Press 1996) (1903). 
T
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punished for hate speech or for some type of prohibited 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.  However, 
this article is concerned with gaining a more general 
understanding of conscientious objection:  opposition to and 
refusal to obey a legal requirement, whether general or 
specific, for reasons of morality and ethics—in a word, 
conscience.  
The United States Constitution offers a limited safe 
harbor for conscience, particularly from being coerced in 
matters of belief and expression.  State constitutions may 
offer other protections, and federal and state statutory law and 
regulations may offer still more.  But ever since the 1990 
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Employment 
Division v. Smith,2 the Free Exercise Clause of the First 
Amendment has been of very limited use in protecting 
religiously motivated conduct as such.   
As a consequence, this article will argue that the most 
viable constitutional strategy for protecting conscientious 
objectors is to bracket the question of whether it is religiously 
motivated. Rather, it will focus simply on the question of 
whether it is a sincerely held moral conviction, while seeking 
to expand existing freedom of speech case law under the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution to maximize 
protection for people of conscience from being obliged to act 
contrary to their conscience.   
To the extent that constitutional protection is inadequate, 
statutory protection and exemptions can be enacted or 
expanded.  Furthermore, to the extent the government finds a 
sufficiently compelling reason to be served thereby, the 
government can provide the contested practice using paid 
volunteers or government employees—anything other than 
coercing action contrary to the consciences of private parties.   
The military’s move from the draft to an all-volunteer 
army is a successful example of such an approach.     A 
similar market-style solution could be devised to address the 
problem of dispensing the morning-after pill or conducting 
gay adoptions.  Let public agencies or private entities that are 
                                                 
2 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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willing to do the tasks that others find morally problematic.  
A better way is needed to accommodate conscientious 
objections than to force people’s consciences to bend or 
break before the coercive power of government. 
After examining the military conscription background, 
where the statutory exemption for conscientious objectors has 
been interpreted by the courts to equate deeply felt non-
religious reasons for conscientious objection with religious 
ones, the first half of this article goes on to consider some 
First Amendment cases that begin to articulate a 
constitutional grounding for conscientious objection in the 
Free Speech Clause, while refusing to privilege specifically 
religious reasons for conscientious objection under the Free 
Exercise Clause.  The second half of the article then 
considers a possible way to resolve these problems by using 
market solutions.  Historically, this was done by abolishing 
the draft and by using government funding to protect those 
conscientiously opposed to abortion.  An attempt is made to 
apply this approach to  two current issues involving gay 
adoptions and the “morning-after” pill. 
 
II. THE MILITARY BACKGROUND 
 
In times of war, and even in times of peace, the United 
States has used conscription to meet its military needs.  The 
military draft, which began during the Civil War and existed 
before the introduction of an all-volunteer military army in 
the 1970s, was the context in which claims of conscientious 
objection were made and heard by courts.  A statutory 
exemption existed for those “person[s]… who, by reason of 
religious training and belief, are conscientiously opposed to 
participation in war in any form.”3   
In 1965, the statute further defined “religious training and 
belief” as “an individual’s belief in a relation to a Supreme 
Being involving duties superior to those arising from any 
human relation, but [not including] essentially political, 
                                                 
3 The War and National Defense Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C.S 
Appx §456 (j). 
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sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal 
moral code.”4  Two observations may be made about this 
statutory provision for conscientious objectors:  (1) it only 
extended to opposition to participation in war in any form; 
and thus did not countenance what could be called selective 
conscientious objection:  objection to this or that particular 
war but not necessarily to all wars; and, (2) it only covered 
religiously-motivated conscientious objection rather than 
conscientious objection out of a “personal moral code.”   
The statutory provision for conscientious objection was 
rather stingy, then, as it accommodated only the totally 
pacifist position, what has been a minority religious 
perspective on warfare similar to the perspective of groups 
like the Quakers or Jehovah’s Witnesses.  Doubtless, this was 
deliberate and served to keep down the number of potential 
conscientious objectors and maximize the number of 
conscripts.  It should be noted, though, that the more 
mainstream Western moral tradition regarding warfare, the 
“just war theory,”5 argued for the morality of some wars and 
the immorality of others.  It was thus a selective 
conscientious objection view, that of the Catholic Church for 
example, which the statute did not accommodate.  The statute 
accommodated only the total pacifist position.   
 The difference between selective conscientious objection 
and total pacifism is illustrated by the recent Vatican decision 
to declare Franz Jägerstätter, an Austrian Catholic farmer 
who was beheaded for refusing to serve in the Nazi army 
during World War II, a martyr.6  He was not,7 nor is Catholic 
                                                 
4 Id. 
5 See, e.g., Catechism of the Catholic Church, paras. 2308, 2309, 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/catechism/p3s2c2a5.htm#III  (last visited 
Oct. 16, 2007) (explaining the Catholic Church’s position on “just war”).  
See e.g., Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Just_War (discussing 
“just war”). 
6 Promulgazione di Decreti Della Congregazione delle Cause Dei 
Santi , June 6, 2007, 
http://212.77.1.245/news_services/bulletin/news/20340.php?index=20340
&po_date=01.06.2007&lang=en (last visited Sept. 7, 2007).  For more 
information on Franz Jagerstatter’s life, see GORDON CHARLES ZAHN, IN 
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teaching,8 opposed to all war, just to the Nazis’ war of 
aggression (though, in judging that the war was immoral, he 
was not supported at the time by his priest and local bishop).  
If Franz were in the United States and refused to serve in 
what he considered an unjust war, then he would not have 
qualified for the exemption for conscientious objectors.  The 
fact that he was declared a martyr means that the Catholic 
Church considers that he died for his faith and that his 
conscientious objection was religiously motivated.  He would 
have met that aspect of the United States statutory exemption 
requirement, though not the requirement that he be opposed 
to war in any form.  
A series of United States Supreme Court decisions 
beginning in 1965, tried to expand the reach of the exemption 
beyond theistic religions.  In United States v. Seeger,9 the 
Court ruled the reference to “Supreme Being” in the statute 
required only “[a] sincere and meaningful belief which 
occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that 
filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the 
exemption.”10   
A subsequent case, Welsh v. United States,11 as a matter 
of statutory interpretation, extended the reach of the 
conscientious objector exemption to a person who was 
philosophically committed to not injuring or killing another 
human, but who refused to characterize his opposition as 
“religious.”  Perhaps more significantly, Justice Harlan 
concurred in the result (the Court’s opinion was a plurality 
opinion) on constitutional grounds:  “[H]aving chosen to 
exempt, [Congress] cannot draw the line between theistic or 
non-theistic religious beliefs on the one hand and secular 
                                                                                                     
SOLITARY WITNESS:  THE LIFE AND DEATH OF FRANZ JAGERSTATTER 
(Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965). 
7 Bruce Kent, Franz Jaggerstatter, Peace People Series (July 1991)  
http://www.paxchristi.org.uk/PeacePeople/Jagerstatter.PDF (last visited 
Oct. 16, 2007). 
8 Catechism of the Catholic Church, supra note 6. 
9 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
10 Id. at 176. 
11 Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
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beliefs on the other.”12  Even though the rest of the Court did 
not join him in that view, it seems that Justice Harlan’s view 
is the most honest under the establishment clause.13  In sum, 
though the protection for conscientious objectors from 
compulsory military service is statutory and not 
constitutional, the Supreme Court has consistently extended it 
to moral and not only religious beliefs.     
In suggesting that conscientious objection be available to 
those who are opposed to laws for secular reasons, rather than 
just religious ones, a problem arises.  A religiously-based 
reason is a certifiably bona fide and sincere reason of 
conscience, whereas a secular reason needs to be verified as 
truly a reason of conscience, as opposed to, say, a simple 
preference.  For example, one could be opposed to service in 
a particular war like the Nazis’ war of aggression or the 
current war in Iraq, because one considered it evil and 
immoral, or simply because one preferred to go about one’s 
business or wanted to spend the time at a resort.  The former 
reason would qualify as conscientious objection, but not the 
latter ones.  To extend the right of conscientious objection to 
the latter would give everyone an automatic exemption from 
laws that they did not want to obey for any reason, which 
would completely undermine the rule of law.   
III. THE FREE SPEECH CASES 
 
The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment has 
served as the constitutional basis for protecting conscientious 
belief.  In ruling that the refusal of Jehovah’s Witness school 
children to salute the flag and pledge allegiance was 
protected by the First Amendment, the Supreme Court in 
1943 famously wrote:   
 
[T]o sustain the compulsory flag salute we are 
required to say that a Bill of Rights which 
guards the individual’s right to speak his own 
                                                 
12 Id. at 356 ( Harlan, J. concurring). 
13 U.S. CONST. Amend. 1 (“Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion…”). 
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mind, left it open to public authorities to 
compel him to utter what is not in his mind. . . 
14 If there is any fixed star in our constitutional 
constellation, it is that no official, high or 
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in 
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters 
of opinion or force citizens to confess by word 
or act their faith therein.15 
 
Since this expansive view of what the First Amendment 
protects was issued in time of war, it is not surprising that 
there was a qualification immediately following the “no 
official orthodoxy” line:  “If there are any circumstances 
which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.”16  
Compulsory military service was a possible exception.   
Justice Murphy’s concurring opinion ended rather 
dramatically, with a ringing endorsement of freedom of 
conscience under the constitution:   
 
Any spark of love for country which may be 
generated in a child or his associates by 
forcing him to make what is to him an empty 
gesture and recite words wrung from him 
contrary to his religious beliefs is 
overshadowed by the desirability of preserving 
freedom of conscience to the full. It is in that 
freedom and the example of persuasion, not in 
force and compulsion, that the real unity of 
America lies.17 
 
                                                 
14 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634 
(1943). 
15  Id. at 642.   
16 Id.  The footnote in the Court’s opinion at that point, said:  “The 
Nation may raise armies and compel citizens to give military service 
(citation omitted). It follows, of course, that those subject to military 
discipline are under many duties and may not claim many freedoms that 
we hold inviolable as to those in civilian life.”  Id. at 642. 
17 Id. at 646 (Murphy, J., concurring). 
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In dissent, Justice Frankfurter described the case as 
involving the competing claims “of a State to enact and 
enforce laws within its general competence or that of an 
individual to refuse obedience because of the demands of his 
conscience.”18  While arguing that religious freedom did not 
entail an exemption from generally applicable laws, even 
Frankfurter recognized that “any person may therefore 
believe or disbelieve what he pleases. He may practice what 
he will in his own house of worship or publicly within the 
limits of public order.”19   
Under the rule of the Barnette20 case, the treason case of 
Sir Thomas More, executed in 1535 in London for refusing 
for reasons of conscience to swear to the oath of supremacy 
(wherein Henry VIII was declared “Supreme Head of the 
Church in England”) would have had to have been dismissed.  
This famous conscientious objector, who was recently voted 
“Lawyer of the Millennium” by the Law Society of Great 
Britain,21 was being required to swear to something in which 
he did not believe.  According to Barnette, the First 
Amendment’s Free Speech Clause places that outside the 
government’s power.   
Another instance where the Supreme Court upheld the 
freedom of conscience to dissent from official orthodoxy was 
the case of Wooley v. Maynard,22 in which another Jehovah’s 
Witness covered up the motto of his license plate, “Live Free 
or Die,” because he conscientiously disagreed with it.  
 
[F]reedom of thought protected by the First 
Amendment . . . includes both the right to 
speak freely and the right to refrain from 
speaking at all.  See [Barnette.] … The right to 
speak and the right to refrain from speaking 
                                                 
18 Id. at 647 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  
19 Id. at 654. 
20 Id.  
21  www.thomasmorestudies.org/reputation_1.html (citing Law 
Society of Great Britain’s Gazette of Dec. 1999) (last visited Oct. 16, 
2007). 
22 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).   
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are complementary components of the broader 
concept of ‘individual freedom of mind.’23   
 
This “individual freedom of mind,” which Barnette had 
first referred to,24 could also be called “freedom of 
conscience.”   
An important discussion of freedom of conscience takes 
place in the case of Girouard v. United States,25 which dealt 
with an appeal from a denial of naturalization to a Seventh 
Day Adventist because he refused to say he would be willing 
to take up arms in defense of the United States.  Previous 
cases had upheld the government’s right to refuse citizenship 
on that basis:  “[A]n alien who refuses to bear arms will not 
be admitted to citizenship.”26  Though these were all statutory 
cases, like the conscientious objection cases involving 
compulsory military service, the statutory interpretation was 
doubtless influenced by constitutional values of freedom of 
thought and conscience. 
Holding that denial of naturalization is inappropriate 
because of a refusal to take up arms, Justice Douglas wrote,  
 
The struggle for religious liberty has through 
the centuries been an effort to accommodate 
the demands of the State to the conscience of 
the individual. The victory for freedom of 
thought recorded in our Bill of Rights 
recognizes that in the domain of conscience 
there is a moral power higher than the State.27 
 
Quite significantly, the 1946 Girouard decision overruled 
a 1931 precedent, which dealt with a minister who was 
denied naturalization because he would not “promise in 
advance to bear arms in any and all future wars, even against 
                                                 
23 Id. at 714. 
24 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637. 
25 Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946). 
26 Id. at 63. 
27 Id. at 68. 
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his conscientious religious scruples.”28  United States v. 
Macintosh was a 5-4 decision, with a resounding dissent 
written by Chief Justice Hughes:   
 
Much has been said of the paramount duty to 
the state, a duty to be recognized, it is urged, 
even though it conflicts with convictions of 
duty to God. Undoubtedly that duty to the 
state exists within the domain of power, for 
government may enforce obedience to laws 
regardless of scruples. When one's belief 
collides with the power of the state, the latter 
is supreme within its sphere and submission or 
punishment follows. But, in the forum of 
conscience, duty to a moral power higher than 
the state has always been maintained. The 
reservation of that supreme obligation, as a 
matter of principle, would unquestionably be 
made by many of our conscientious and law-
abiding citizens. …. Macintosh, when pressed 
by the inquiries put to him, stated what is 
axiomatic in religious doctrine. And, putting 
aside dogmas with their particular conceptions 
of deity, freedom of conscience itself implies 
respect for an innate conviction of paramount 
duty. The battle for religious liberty has been 
fought and won with respect to religious 
beliefs and practices, which are not in conflict 
with good order, upon the very ground of the 
supremacy of conscience within its proper 
field. What that field is, under our system of 
government, presents in part a question of 
constitutional law, and also, in part, one of 
legislative policy in avoiding unnecessary 
clashes with the dictates of conscience. There 
is abundant room for enforcing the requisite 
authority of law as it is enacted and requires 
                                                 
28 United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 610 (1931). 
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obedience, and for maintaining the conception 
of the supremacy of law as essential to orderly 
government, without demanding that either 
citizens or applicants for citizenship shall 
assume by oath an obligation to regard 
allegiance to God as subordinate to allegiance 
to civil power. The attempt to exact such a 
promise, and thus to bind one's conscience by 
the taking of oaths or the submission to tests, 
has been the cause of many deplorable 
conflicts.29 
 
By reversing the Macintosh precedent, the Hughes dissent 
in effect became the law of the land at the end of World War 
II in the Girouard decision.   
 
IV.  THE FREE EXERCISE CASE 
 
In the 1990 case of Employment Division v. Smith, a 
majority of the United States Supreme Court, however, 
endorsed Frankfurter’s point about no religious exemptions 
from generally applicable laws under the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment30 (although protection of 
conscience from government-coerced official orthodoxy 
remains under the Free Speech Clause).  The Smith case 
involved a couple of state workers dismissed because of their 
use of peyote, a controlled substance, in Native American 
ritual.31  Justice Scalia wrote for the Court, finding that all 
that is needed to sustain a law that is generally applicable and 
not specifically targeted at religious practice is some rational 
basis.32  There is only heightened judicial scrutiny of the law 
if it deliberately targets religious practice or burdens some 
other constitutional freedom as well (producing a “hybrid” 
claim).33   
                                                 
29 Id. at 633-634 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting). 
30 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
31 Id.  
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
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Of course, there is some heightened judicial scrutiny of 
laws that govern expressive conduct or symbolic speech.  In 
addition, the First Amendment right to remain silent (or 
freedom from compelled speech) serves as an avenue for 
protecting conscience and its expression.34 
Thus far, we have seen how religious and secular reasons 
for conscientious objection tend to be treated the same by our 
legal system and that there is some First Amendment basis 
for recognizing “freedom of conscience” in that broad sense.  
The rest of this article will explore the use of market 
solutions to the dilemma of legal obligations forcing people 
to act against their conscience.   
 
V. A SUGGESTION TO LET THE MARKET HANDLE THE 
PROBLEM 
 
Since the 1970s, the problem of how to handle 
conscientious objectors from compulsory military service has 
been largely eliminated by abolishing the draft and instituting 
an all-volunteer military.  Although there are some questions 
about whether such an arrangement is sufficient to produce 
enough soldiers in time of war, the United States has been 
able to rely on the free market and volunteers to fill its 
military needs.  (However, there seems to be a significant 
problem attracting recruits and getting people to re-enlist in 
the present war in Iraq, for example).  Since no one is forced 
to act against his or her conscientiously held beliefs, the 
problem of conscientious objection does not arise in that 
context.35 
Another area of the law that seems to have finessed the 
problem of conscientious objectors is the system of public 
financing for controversial medical procedures.  Abortion is 
                                                 
34 See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual 
Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
35 Of course, there still remains the problem of what to do with the 
soldier who freely enlisted but who subsequently finds that what he is 
asked to do is morally problematic.  International and military law would 
protect him from having to obey orders that involved the killing of 
innocent civilians, for instance.   
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the obvious example here.  The Hyde Amendment, which cut 
off federal funding for non-therapeutic abortions and was 
upheld by the United States Supreme Court, in effect 
recognized that such abortions were morally abhorrent to a 
significant group of the citizenry, and as a result those 
citizens would not be forced to pay for it through their tax 
dollars.36  Further, the Weldon Amendment forbids recipients 
of federal funds from discriminating against individuals or 
institutions because they refused to perform abortions or refer 
people for abortions.37 
Earlier, the so-called gag rule had been operative, which 
cut off federal funds for family planning services that 
counseled or referred for abortion.  The Supreme Court, in 
Rust v. Sullivan,38 affirmed this regulation.   
At the state level, a number of laws protect conscientious 
objection against abortion. The Massachusetts law is 
interesting because it essentially protects health care workers 
who refuse to participate in abortions for either religious or 
moral reasons and prohibits any discrimination against those 
opposed to abortion in government-funded programs.  Thus, 
it functions like a state version of the Weldon Amendment at 
the federal level:  use of state funds is the basis for, in effect, 
                                                 
36 The Hyde Amendment was first enacted by Pub.L. No. 94-439, 
title II, sec. 209, 90 Stat. 1434 (1976).  The Supreme Court upheld the 
enactment in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
37 Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, §508(d), Pub.L. No. 108-
447, 118 Stat. 2809, 3163 (2004).  This Act states:  
(1) None of the funds made available in this Act may be 
made available to a Federal agency or program, or to a 
State or local government, if such agency, program, or 
government subjects any institutional or individual 
health care entity to discrimination on the basis that the 
health care entity does not provide, pay for, provide 
coverage of, or refer for abortions. (2) In this 
subsection, the term “health care entity” includes an 
individual physician or other health care professional, a 
hospital, a provider-sponsored organization, a health 
maintenance organization, a health insurance plan, or 
any other kind of health care facility, organization, or 
plan. Id. 
38 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).   
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purchasing respect for conscientious objection by private 
parties in receipt of the funds.39   
The Massachusetts General Laws state, in part: 
 
A physician or any other person who is a 
member of or associated with the medical staff 
of a hospital or other health facility or any 
employee of a hospital or other health facility 
in which an abortion or any sterilization 
procedure is scheduled and who shall state in 
writing an objection to such abortion or 
sterilization procedure on moral or religious 
grounds, shall not be required to participate in 
the medical procedures … and the refusal of 
any such person to participate therein shall not 
form the basis for any claim of damages on 
account of such refusal or for any disciplinary 
or recriminatory action against such person. 
The refusal of any person who has made 
application to a medical, premedical, nursing, 
social work, or psychology program in the 
commonwealth to agree to counsel, suggest, 
recommend, assist, or in any way participate 
in the performance of an abortion or 
sterilization contrary to his religious beliefs or 
moral convictions shall not form the basis for 
any discriminatory action against such 
person.40   
 
This is an ideal statutory provision for conscience, 
religious or moral, protecting people of conscience from 
being required to violate their conscience in performing, or 
recommending or in any way participating in abortion.   
The second part of the Massachusetts law is premised on 
state funding: 
 
                                                 
39 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, §12 I (2007). 
40 Id.  
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Conscientious objection to abortion shall not 
be grounds for dismissal, suspension, 
demotion, failure to promote, discrimination in 
hiring, withholding of pay or refusal to grant 
financial assistance under any state aided 
project, or used in any way to the detriment of 
the individual in any hospital, clinic, medical, 
premedical, nursing, social work, or 
psychology school or state aided program or 
institution which is supported in whole or in 
part by the commonwealth.41  
 
Here the state is using the power of the purse strings to 
further protect individuals conscientiously opposed to 
abortion.  Of course, it is not the money that is at issue, but 
the principle.  But relying on the market to, in effect, 
purchase voluntary compliance is preferable to simply 
forcing people to act.   
 
VI.  TWO CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 
 
The issue of legal accommodation of conscientious 
objection remains topical: Two current controversies involve 
the morning-after pill and gay adoption. Illinois has purported 
to require pharmacists and physicians to dispense the 
morning-after pill.42 Similarly, Massachusetts has recently 
decided that Catholic Charities must stop doing adoptions 
because of the refusal of the Catholic Church to serve 
homosexual couples.43 One can well ask whether such 
coercion of private parties to act against their conscience or 
be driven from the field is wise, as a matter of public policy.   
                                                 
41 Id. 
42 29 Ill. Reg. 5586 and 29 Ill. Reg. 13639, 13640, codified at 68 Ill. 
Admin. Code §1330.91(j) (2005). 
43 Patricia Wen, Catholic Charities Stuns State, Ends Adoptions, 
BOSTON GLOBE, March 11, 2006, available at 
http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2006/03/11/catholic_charities
_stuns_state_ends_adoptions/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2007). 
54         Trends and Issues in Constitutional Law           Vol. 2 
 
  
If the government thinks that access to the morning-after 
pill is so important, why not rely on government dispensaries 
or willing volunteers to do it?  Let the market meet the need.   
People and institutions that find the morning-after pill 
morally problematic would not be required to do what they 
regard as “dirty work,” sullying their consciences.   
Similarly, government agencies or willing private 
agencies could (and do) serve homosexual couples in their 
desire to adopt.   Why coerce unwilling private entities that 
find homosexual adoptions problematic?  
In Massachusetts, two state administrative regulations 
cause problems. One requires that “placement agencies” for 
adoption not discriminate in providing services on the basis 
of marital status or sexual orientation, among other things.44 
Another regulation, from the Department of Social Services, 
similarly prohibits discrimination on those grounds by 
entities that receive state funding to assist with adoptions of 
special-needs children.  The receipt of government funding of 
course complicates the ability of Catholic Charities to 
“discriminate.”45  If it refused the funds, though, it could still 
continue to provide adoption services according to its 
conscientious judgment, if the argument of this article were 
accepted.  
The clash arises because Catholic Charities is refusing to 
place children with homosexual couples because it conflicts 
with church teaching. So over a matter of principle, when the 
state made Catholic Charities choose, the agency chose the 
pope.  
Now, admittedly the acting-on-principle angle was 
undermined when The Boston Globe reported that Catholic 
Charities has placed thirteen children with same-sex couples 
in the past.46 Some have wondered if Catholic Charities is 
                                                 
44 John Garvey, State Putting Church Out of Adoption Business, 
BOSTON GLOBE, March 14, 2006, available at 
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2006/
03/14/state_putting_church_out_of_adoption_business/ (last visited Oct. 
16, 2007). 
45 Id.   
46 See Wen, supra note 43. 
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really standing on principle or just hiding behind the 
Vatican’s cassock.  
But it is important to note that on the point of same-sex 
adoption, the Vatican has been clear. In 2003, the Vatican’s 
Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith issued a 
document condemning adoption by homosexuals. It was 
signed by the head of the congregation, Cardinal Joseph 
Ratzinger (now Pope Benedict XVI), and approved by John 
Paul II.  
The document calls same-sex parenting arrangements 
“gravely immoral” because,  
 
[T]he absence of sexual complementarity in 
these unions creates obstacles in the normal 
development of children who would be placed 
in the care of such persons. They would be 
deprived of the experience of either fatherhood 
or motherhood. Allowing children to be 
adopted by persons living in such unions 
would actually mean doing violence to these 
children, in the sense that their condition of 
dependency would be used to place them in an 
environment that is not conducive to their full 
human development.47  
 
Obviously, not everybody agrees with that assessment. 
And given Catholic Charities’ checkered record on same-sex 
adoption, it is obvious that even Catholics in a position of 
authority have not always followed the church’s teaching.  
But the teaching could not be clearer. For Catholics, the 
Catholic Church’s highest authority has spoken decisively on 
an issue of faith and morals. It should hardly be surprising 
that Catholic organizations, if they wish to remain Catholic, 
                                                 
47 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Considerations 
regarding Proposals to Give Legal Recognition to Unions between 
Homosexual Persons, June 3, 2003, http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/ 
congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20030731_homosexu
al-unions_en.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2007).  
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are required by their religion to act in a manner consistent 
with church teaching.  
Adoptions, we are told, are different, because these 
placement agencies act in a governmental capacity, rather 
than in loco parentis. Why does a mere license from the 
government, or even government funding, make them 
governmental actors? After all, birth mothers can veto 
prospective adoptive parents for any reason or no reason at all 
— because they are the wrong race, or the wrong sexual 
orientation, or the wrong religion — even though the 
government itself obviously could not discriminate in that 
manner.  
Furthermore, the fact that Catholic Charities does not 
place children with homosexual couples does not prevent 
homosexual couples from adopting through some other 
agency. In fact, in the Worcester diocese of Massachusetts, 
the practice has been to refer such couples to other agencies.  
More radically, what sense does it make for the 
regulations to prohibit discrimination on the basis of marital 
status? Does that really mean that it would be wrong for a 
private adoption agency to prefer placing kids with married 
couples, rather than singles or unmarried couples? If so, then 
the law is, as Mr. Bumble duly noted, “a [sic] ass — a 
idiot.”48  
Now come our state legislators, who have announced they 
will make no exemption from the anti-discrimination state 
regulations governing adoption for religious organizations. 
To vindicate the alleged rights of a relative handful of adult 
homosexuals to adopt and to force private organizations to 
serve them, our state leaders would force faithful 
conscientious Catholics to get out of the adoption business 
altogether.  
Consider the impact. The church and its associated 
charitable endeavors have helped thousands of orphans find 
loving homes. In pure numbers, same-sex couples seeking to 
adopt are relatively few.  
                                                 
48 CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST, 520 (Dodd, Mead & Co. 1941) 
(1837). 
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Some say the numbers are not the most important things 
because the argument is over a matter of principle. But what 
is the principle that state officials are defending? It is not 
whether same-sex couples can adopt children. Rightly or 
wrongly, that matter has already been decided in favor of 
same-sex adopters.  
The principle at issue is whether same-sex couples can 
adopt children through every entity in the commonwealth that 
wishes to assist in adoptions, regardless of the religious 
beliefs of the people and organizations that want to do that 
charitable work.  
The argument presented here would say that government 
should be more respectful of people’s consciences.  People 
should not be forced to do things that violate their 
conscience.  If the morning-after pill or gay adoptions are so 
important to the commonwealth, then legalize the use of the 
pill or authorize gay adoptions.  State agencies can offer these 
services or pay private parties to do so on a volunteer basis.  
But people of conscience should not be forced to do so 
against their will and judgment, for better or worse.  It may 
happen, of course, that some people would go without 
services that they would otherwise want, but in a free society, 
respect for conscience should not dragoon people into acting 
against their deeply felt moral convictions.  That is just the 
price we pay for a free society. 
Our Constitution eliminated religious tests for public 
office and inserted the ability to make legally binding 
commitments by affirmation as well as oath to accommodate 
the conscientious objection of Quakers to swearing oaths.  
The guarantee of religious freedom that begins the First 
Amendment and the broad scope of freedom of speech and 
association that fills it out, and indeed the provision of the 
Fifth Amendment against compelled self-incrimination, all 
manifest a solemn respect for freedom of conscience vis-à-vis 
the law and the government. The conscientious objection 
does not have to be religiously motivated, so long as it is 
sincere. 
The compelled speech cases provide the clearest 
vindication of freedom of conscience from government 
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coercion but do not protect against the military draft.  For that 
and many other conflicts, statutory protection for conscience 
is necessary.  Similarly, the conscientious objection to 
abortion and other types of medical procedures has generally 
been protected around the country by various types of 
legislation, both federal and state.  There has also been a 
trend to condition receipt of state funds on respecting 
conscience, and the example of the abolition of the military 
draft and its replacement by more attractive recruiting efforts 
all point in the direction of using the free market to meet the 
perceived needs of society, rather than rely on government 
compulsion.   
St. Francis of Assisi, the famous thirteenth-century friar 
who founded the Franciscans, had this piece of advice for his 
followers with respect to conscience: “If a superior 
commands his subject anything that is against his conscience, 
the subject should not spurn his authority, even though he 
cannot obey him.”49  When governmental authority and 
individual conscience come into conflict, the government 
should for its part relent, if possible, and thus make it easier 
for the citizen to not spurn its legitimate authority. 
 
                                                 
49  ST. FRANCIS OF ASSISI, WRITINGS AND EARLY  BIOGRAPHIES, 
ENGLISH OMNIBUS OF SOURCES FOR THE LIFE OF ST. FRANCIS 
Admonitions, III, 80, (Marion A. Habig ed., Franciscan Herald Press 
1973).   
